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I INTRODUCTION 
The rule of law requires that those who commit criminal acts should be 
brought to justice. Its enforcement is impaired if the system which the law 
provides for bringing such cases to trial does not protect the essential 
witnesses from unnecessary humiliation and distress. 1 
The legal treatment of rape victims has historically made it difficult to prosecute 
rape complaints. Perhaps the strongest barrier has been the law 's adoption of, or at least 
willingness to tolerate, rape myths. These myths are familiar to us all, women mean 
"yes" when they say " no"; only virgins can be raped; women are vengeful creatures out 
to get men; if a woman says "yes" once there is no reason to believe her no the next time, 
the list goes on.2 These myths, although untrue and overwhelmingly discredited by 
research, play an important role in the way judges, jurors and others perceive testimony 
in rape trials. 
Rape myths have been used to justify the admission and use of sexual history 
evidence in rape trials. The relevance of a complainant's sexual history is determined 
according to whether she is the type of women to say yes. This reliance on rape myths 
has contributed to the traumatic ordeals experienced by rape victims in the court process. 
In the 1996 New Zealand Rape Study for example, victims reported feeling "violated 
again and again by the judicial system".3 The purpose of rape shield legislation has thus 
1 R v A [2002] I AC 45 , para 92 (HL) Lord Hope of Craighead. 
2 M Torrey "When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions" 
(1990) 24 UC Davis L Rev 1013, 1014. 
3 E McDonald "Women Rape Complainant's Experiences of the Court Process" in The Proceedings of 
Rape: Ten Years Progress? An Inter-Disciplinary Conference (1996) 84, 92. 
3 
been to limit these inferences. Rape shield legislation however has a number of goals; (l) 
the exclusion of in-elevant and prejudicial evidence; (2) the protections of rape victims; 
(3) the encouragement of rape victims to bring charges against their attacker; and (4) the 
protection of the autonomy of women to say no, even if they have said yes in the past.
4 
This paper intends to focus on just one of these objectives, that is, the protection of rape 
victims in the court process. In light of this goal this paper will assess the extent to which 
the Evidence Act 2006 regulates sexual history evidence to protect victims from intrusive 
and embarrassing questions in court. 
One of the difficulties that arises in relation to rape shield legislation is how to 
balance the competing interests. The appropriate policy must balance the defendant's and 
victim's interests. The defendant's right to a fair trial is guaranteed under s 25 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This right includes the right to present a defence 
and examine witness for the prosecution. Complainants on the other hand are guaranteed 
the right to be treated with dignity and respect under s7 of the Victims Rights Act 2002. 
This includes protecting victims from humiliating and embarrassing cross-examination. 
In R v McClintock for example, the court held that judges had to strike a just balance 
between protecting complainants from undue harassment and unduly hampering the 
defence.5 These rights however must also be balanced against a third competing interest, 
that is, the public interest in ensuring the integrity of the system by bringing offenders to 
justice and ensuring that the innocent are not convicted. 
This essay intends to assess the extent to which the Evidence Act 2006 regulates 
sexual history evidence and protects victims from intrusive and embarrassing questions in 
4 G Hire "Holding Husbands and Lovers Accountable for Rape: Eliminating the Defendant Exception of 
Rape Shield Laws" ( I 996) 5 S Cal Rev L & Women's Stud 59 I , 595. 
5 R v McClintock (1986) 2 NZLR 99, 104 (CA) Cooke P for the court. 
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court. This essay then further suggests alternative proposals which seek to clarify and 
extend the rights afforded to victims in sexual case while maintaining fairness for the 
accused. 
II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A The Common Law 
Under the common law, a woman's previous sexual experience was relevant to 
her credibility as a witness.6 The law assumed that a promiscuous woman was inherently 
untrustworthy and prone to fabricating rape complaints. In State v Sibley for example, 
the court held "it is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for 
chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth ... whilst is does 
that of a woman".7 This assumption allowed defendants to adduce evidence of the 
complainant's past sexual experience and her general reputation in sexual matters to 
discredit her testimony. 8 
The complainant's past sexual experience was also relevant to whether she 
consented to sexual intercourse with the accused. The victim's past sexual behaviour was 
used by defence counsels to insinuate that she was more likely to have consented on the 
occasion in question.9 In State v Wood for example, the court held that a "woman who 
has once departed from the paths of virtue is far more apt to consent to another lapse than 
6 J Temkin "Regulating Sexual History Evidence: The Limits of Discretionary Legi lation" (1984) 33 Int'I 
& Comp LQ 942, 943. 
7 State v Sibley ( I 895) 132 Mo 102, 171 Burgess J. 
8 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales Review of Section 409B of the Crimes Act 1990 (Report 
87, 1998) para 3.5-3.7. 
9 Ibid. 
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is one who has never stepped aside from that path".
10 This assumption has been referred 
to as the yes/yes inference that is "yes to some men sometimes means yes to any man any 
time". 11 
In the J 970's, the admission of sexual history evidence came under increasing 
criticism by women's rights groups. The laws and legal procedures relating to sexual 
assault were condemned by feminists for their sexist assumptions and moral judgements 
about women. 12 In particular the use of sexual history evidence was criticised on three 
grounds. First, the links between sexual experience, credibility and consent were based 
on factually questionable assumptions. 13 The complainant's previous sexual experience 
could not be logically linked to her credibility as a witness nor could it be used to 
meaningfully predict her behaviour on a different occasion.
14 Second, the use of sexual 
history evidence contributed to the re-victimisation of complainants.
15 
In the 1983 and 
1996 New Zealand rape studies for example, cross-examination was consistently 
described "as worse then the rape itself'. 16 This not only compounded to the trauma of 
the original rape, but discouraged victims from reporting the offence. Third, the 
admission of sexual history evidence contributed to the low conviction rates for rape. In 
2005 for instance, only 208 out of 671 rape prosecutions resulted in conviction.
17 
The 
victim's past sexual history was used by defence counsels to put the victim and her 
10 State v Wood (1942) 122 P.2d 416,418 (Ariz) Lockwood CJ. 
11 C Fishman "Consent, Credibility and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offence 
Complainant's Past Sexual Behaviour" ( 1995) 44 Catholic University Law Review 709, 715. 
12 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 8, para3.8. 
13 Fishman, above n 11 , 716. 
14 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility: A Discussion Paper, 
(Wellington, 1997) 111. 
15 Fishman, above n 11, 716. 
16 J Stone, R Barrington, C Bevan Rape Study: Research Reports (Vol. 2, Department of Justice, 
Wellington) 73; E McDonald "Women Rape Complainant's Experiences of the Court Process" above n 3, 
91. 
17 Statistics New Zealand, Conviction and Sentencing Tables, www .statistics.govt.nz . 
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credibility on trial. This decreased the accused's responsibility for the attack by focusing 
on the victim's behaviour on earlier unrelated occasions. 18 This has lead some 
commentators to suggest that a man has to be "very unlucky" to be convicted of rape. 19 
B Section 23A Evidence Act 1908 
In response to calls for reform, New Zealand enacted s23A of the Evidence Act 
1908. S23A provides:20 
(2) In any case of a sexual nature, no evidence shall be given. and no question shall be put 
to a witness , relating directly or indirectly to -
(a) The sexual experience of the complainant with any person other than the accused; or 
(b) The reputation of the complainant in sexual matters , -
Except by leave of the judge. 
(3) The Judge shall not grant leave under subsection (2) of this section unless the Judge is 
satisfied that the evidence to be given or the question to be put is of such direct relevance to -
(a) Facts in issue in the proceeding; or 
(b) The issue of the appropriate sentence, -
As the case may require, that to exclude it would be contrary to the interests of justice: 
Provided that any such evidence or question shall not be regarded as being of such direct 
relevance by reason only of any inference it may raise as to the general disposition or 
propensity of the complainant in sexual matters. 
S23A allowed judges to admit sexual history evidence where it was of "such direct 
relevance to facts in issue ... that to exclude it would be contrary to the interests of 
18 New Zealand Law Commission Reform of the Law (NZLC R55, Wellington, 1999) 52. 
19 R Wright "A Note on Attrition in Rape Cases" (l 984) 24 Brit J Criminology 280, 281. 
20 Evidence Act 1908, s23A. 
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justice". This was a strong test. 21 In R v McC!intock Cooke P acknowledged that many 
questions going only to credit would be excluded.
22 
S44 of the Evidence Act 2006 re-enacts the 'direct relevance' test in s23A. The 
past application of s23A may thus be helpful in assessing how the courts will interpret 
s44 in the future. The New Zealand courts generally interpreted s23A according to its 
intention to protect complainants from unnecessary and intrusive questions on their 
sexual past. In 1983 for example, leave to admit evidence was granted in only six out of 
sixty four trials.23 There were however isolated cases in which sexual history evidence 
was admitted inappropriately.
24 
Despite the success of s23A however, rape shield legislation has only offered 
limited relief to complainants. The Hon E W Thomas for example argued that they "have 
not removed the brutality of the victims experience in the Courtroom. It remains a 
traumatic ordeal".25 In light of this shortfall, the author argues that the protections 
offered to complainants should be clarified and extended where it is consistent with 
fairness to the accused to do so. 
III REFORMING THE LAW AND THE DEFENDANTS RIGHTS 
One of the difficulties that arises in relation to rape shield legislation is how to 
balance the competing interests. Any reform of the Jaw must take into account the 
21 R v McC/intock , above n 5, 104. 
22 Ibid. 
23 W Young Rape Study: A Discussion of Law and Practice (vol. l , Department of Justice, Wellington, 
1983) 133. 
24 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility: A Discussion Paper above n 
14, 105 . 
25 Hon E W Thomas "Was Eve Merely Framed ; or Was She Forsaken" [ 1994] NZLJ 368, 37 I . 
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community's, victims and defendants interests. This notion of balance has been rejected 
by some commentators. Ashworth for example argues that:
26 
The first step should be to ascertain what the aim of a given part of the criminal process is 
and then to ascertain what rights ought to be accorded to suspects, defendants and victims. If 
there are conflicts, as there often are, then the justifications for the rights and their relative 
strength must be examined with care. To short-cut this process with bland assertions of 
"balance" leads to sloppy reasoning. 
Ashworth argues that certain principles, interests and rights are inviolable. If 
derogation is allowed, it should be kept to a minimum. This is supported by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal. In R v Griffin for example, the right to a fair trial was 
recognised as absolute.27 This raises the question whether the right to a fair trial is 
sufficiently flexible to give adequate protection to both the accused and the complainant. 
In R v Gr(ffin and R v Hines Thomas J, dissenting, acknowledged that the right to a fair 
trial was "as near to an absolute right as any that can be envisaged".
28 However while the 
right to a fair trial was absolute, the rights and safeguards enacted to ensure a fair trial 
were not. The court retained discretion as to the application of these rights, which was 
invariably governed by the need to ensure a fair trial. 29 This approach has been applied 
in other common law jurisdictions. In R v Darrach for example, the court held that while 
the right to "make a full answer and defence are certainly core principles of fundamental 
26 A Ashworth "Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism" [1996] Crim LR 220,229. 
27 R v Griffin (200 I) 3 NZLR 577 , 587 (CA) Richardson P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ. 
28 R v Hines ( 1997) 3 NZLR 529, 563 (CA) Thomas J. 
29 R v Griffin, above n 27,592; R v Hines, above n 28, 563-564. 
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justice; they can be respected without the accused being entitled to 'the most favourable 
procedures that could possibly be imagined'".
30 
The author acknowledges the importance of ensuring the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. However, the defendant's right to present a defence and cross examine 
witnesses for the prosecution may be encroached without prejudicing the accused's right 
to a fair trial. In light of these considerations, it is necessary to consider how far we can 
extend the rights and protections afforded to victims before the defendant's right to a fair 
trial is breached. This essay seeks only to suggest alternatives to the Evidence Act 2006 
that are consistent with the accused's right to a fair trial. To do otherwise would be 
inconsistent with the values underlying our judicial system. 
IV SEXUAL REPUTATION 
A Law Commission's Recommendations 
The Law Commission proposed extending s23A to completely prohibit evidence 
or questions relating to the complainant's sexual reputation for the purpose of supporting 
or challenging the complainant's truthfulness or consent. Evidence of the complainant's 
sexual reputation used for other purposes would still be admissible by leave of the judge 
if it was of direct relevance to the facts in issue.31 Reputation evidence generally refers to 
evidence of generally held beliefs and opinions about the character of the complainant 
and her propensity for prorruscuity. It does not include specific incidents of sexual 
30 R v Darrach [2000] 2 SCR 443, para24 Gonthier J for the court; R v Lyons (1987) 2 SCR 309, 362 Smith 
J. 
31 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility: A Discussion Paper, above n 
14, 111. 
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activity or experience. 32 This definition however is not exhaustive. Sexual reputation 
evidence and sexual experience evidence often overlap. 
The Law Commission considered reputation evidence to be of minimal probative 
value. The complainant's reputation in sexual matters cannot be logically linked to her 
truthfulness as a witness nor can it be used to meaningfully predict her behaviour on a 
different occasion. 33 
B Section 44(2) Evidence Act 2006 
S44(2) provides, "in a sexual case, no evidence can be given and no question can 
be put to a witness that relates directly or indirectly to the reputation of the complainant 
in sexual matters".34 S44(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 extended the Commission's 
proposal by completely prohibiting evidence and questions relating to the complainants 
reputation in se~ual matters. The Select Committee were of the view that reputation 
evidence was irrelevant and should not be admitted.35 This approach is consistent with 
other common law jurisdictions. 
S44(2) appears to have significantly changed the position in s23A. A judge may 
no longer admit evidence of the complainant's reputation in sexual matters. It is 
questionable however whether s44(2) will have a practical effect on the admission of 
sexual reputation evidence. Research into the effectiveness of s23A suggests that sexual 
32 Criminal Justice Taskforce Responding ro Sexual Assaulr: The Way Forward (Criminal Justice 
Taskforce, New South Wales, 2005) 60. 
33 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Characrer and Credibility: A Discussion Paper above n 
14, 111. 
34 Evidence Act 2006, s44(2). 
35 Justice and Electoral Committee Evidence Bill (Wellington, 2006) 7. 
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reputation evidence is already rarely admitted.36 The prohibition in s44(2) will thus only 
capture the few cases in which sexual reputation evidence is wrongly included. 
The protections extended to complainants in s44(2) however have symbolic 
importance. A key objective of rape shield legislation has been to encourage victims to 
report sexual assault.37 Research suggests that sexual history evidence plays a major role 
in the decision not to report. In a 2006 study conducted in the United Kingdom for 
example, fifty percent of respondents acknowledged that sexual history evidence was a 
major factor in deciding not to report. 38 Similarly, in a New Zealand study, twenty seven 
percent of respondents chose not to report to avoid the risk of further embaffassment.
39 
The absolute prohibition on sexual reputation evidence may encourage victims of rape to 
report sexual offending. If victims are aware that they will not be subjected to 
unnecessary and humiliating cross-examination they may be more willing to report the 
offence. These changes may also have a positive impact on the quality of the 
complainant's evidence.
40 
The changes to the admission of sexual reputation evidence may also impact on 
judicial attitudes. Under the proviso in s23A judges could admit evidence of the 
complainant's propensity in sexual matters where it was directly relevant to the facts in 
issue. S44(2) has not re-enacted this proviso. It is possible that the courts will be 
reluctant to exclude evidence they have traditionally viewed as directly relevant to the 
36 Young, above n 23, 133. 
37 L Kelly, J Temkin and S Griffiths Section 41: An Evaluation of New Legislation Limiting Sexual History 
Evidence in Rape Trials (Home Office, 2006) 6. 
38 Ibid , 62. 
39 P Mayhew and J Reilly New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2006) 
38. 
40 Elisabeth McDonald, Yvette Tinsley and Donna Buckingham Submission on Evidence Bill (submission 
to Justice and Electoral Select Committee, 2005) 4. 
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facts in issue, however, this is unlikely. The New Zealand courts have generally applied 
rape shield provisions in the spirit in which they were enacted. 41 It is thus reasonable to 
assume that they will continue to do so. 
C S37(1) Evidence Act 2006 the Veracity Provisions 
One of the issues that arises in relation to sexual reputation evidence is whether 
s44(2) will exclude evidence of the complainant's reputation for making false rape 
complaints. In R v T the English Court of Appeal held that "false statements in the past 
by the complainant about sexual assaults ... relate not to her sexual behaviour but to her 
statements in the past".42 This was accepted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v 
McDonald who noted that "where it is clear that the complainant has previously made 
false complainants, there is substantial scope for argument that questions addressed to 
this topic are not subject to s23A".43 This suggests that the courts may distinguish 
evidence of the complainant's reputation in sexual matters from evidence of the 
complainant's reputation for truthfulness involving sexual matters. This analysis means 
that evidence of the complainant's reputation for making false rape complainants, at least 
in "clean cases",44 will not be subject to the prohibition in s44(2). It will however be 
subject to the veracity provisions in s37 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
S37(1) of the Evidence Act 2006 provides that "a party may not offer evidence in 
a civil or criminal proceeding about a person's veracity unless the evidence is 
substantially helpful in assessing that person's veracity". It is doubtful whether 
4 1 Young, above n 23, 133. 
42 R v T [2002] 1 All ER 683 , para 33 (CA) Keene LJ for the Court. 
43 R v McDonald (8 April 2005) CA166/04, para 36 Anderson P, Glazebrook and William Young JJ . 
44 Ibid. 
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reputation evidence will met the "substantially helpful" test in s37(1). The Select 
Committee were of the view that reputation evidence for all purposes was irrelevant and 
should not be admitted.45 Reputation evidence is an unreliable source of information. A 
person's reputation may be based solely on gossip and untruths.
46 
It thus unlikely that 
evidence of the complainant's reputation for malcing false rape complaints will be 
admissible under either ss 44(2) or 37(1) of the Evidence Act 2006. However, the 
possibility remains that the courts will admit evidence of the complainant's reputation in 
sexual matters where it relates solely or mainly to the complainant's veracity as a witness. 
D The Right to a Fair Trial 
S44(2) is consistent with the purposes of the Evidence Act 2006 in three respects. 
First, s44(2) seeks to promote "fairness to parties and witnesses"
47 
by protecting the 
complainant from unnecessary and intrusive questioning. Second, s44(2) seeks to ensure 
the best possible evidence is available to the court by "providing for facts to be 
established by the application of logical rules"
48 and thirdly, s44(2) seeks to promote 
other "important public interests"49 such as protecting victims from irrelevant and 
embarrassing questioning, encouraging victims to report sexual assault and preventing the 
utilisation of rape myths in decision malcing. 
Despite these consistencies however, s44(2) also appears to conflict with 
fundamental purposes in the Act. The increased protection offered to complainants in 
45 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n35 , 7. 
46 Wellington Women Lawyers Association Supplementary Submission of the Evidence Bill (submission to 
Justice and Electoral elect Committee, 2006) 2. 
47 Evidence Act 2006, s6(c). 
48 Evidence Act 2006, s6(a) . 
49 Evidence Act 2006, s6(d) . 
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s44(2) conflicts with the rights protected under s6(b) of the Evidence Act 2006 and s25 of 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Under s25 (e) and (f) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 the 
defendant has the right to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution and present a 
defence. Any limitation on these rights may impact on the defendant's fundamental right 
to a fair trial.50 This however will depend on whether the limitation is justified in light of 
other competing public interests. 
The Evidence Act 2006 was intended to protect a number of conflicting public 
interests. These include not only ensuring the innocent are not convicted, but ensuring 
the integrity of the system by bringing offenders to justice. These broad objectives may 
be achieved despite the conflict in s44(2). Evidence of the complainant's reputation in 
sexual matters is of low probative value. It does little more then raise the inference that 
the complainant is the type of women who will always say yes. The defendant's right to 
present a defence and cross-examine witnesses is thus not unreasonably restricted by 
s44(2). "He does not. .. suffer any real prejudice by being deprived of an opportunity to 
fling indiscriminate and in-elevant mud".51 
E Defining Reputation 
The Evidence Act 2006 does not define the terms "sexual reputation" or "sexual 
experience". Nor does it appear that there has been any detailed consideration of the term 
"sexual reputation" in New Zealand case law. This may prove to be problematic. In 
some Australian jurisdictions for instance, the overlap between sexual reputation and 
sexual experience has been used by judges to circumnavigate the laws prohibiting sexual 
50 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Law: Witness A11011vmity (NZLC R42, Wellington, 1997) 9. 
51 R v Gunn; Stephenson Ex Parte (1977) 17 SASR 165, 169 Bray CJ. 
15 
reputation evidence. The Department for Women for example, found that despite the 
prohibition of reputation evidence, evidence of the complainant's sexual reputation was 
admitted in nearly twelve percent of the cases studied.
52 
Material which should have 
been classified as sexual reputation evidence was being defined as sexual experience 
evidence and thus was admissible by leave of the judge.
53 
In light of these findings a 
number of studies have concluded that judges and lawyers would benefit from a clear 
legislative definition of sexual reputation.54 This would ensure that the prohibition on 
reputation evidence was consistently applied and more easily distinguished from 
.d f 1 . 55 ev1 ence o sexua experience. 
This issue was considered by the New South Wales Law Commission in its 
review of s409B of the Crimes Act 1990. The Commission concluded that the term 
sexual reputation should not be legislatively defined. The inclusion of a legislative 
definition of sexual reputation could wrongly exclude relevant evidence which may also 
be characterised as evidence of sexual experience.
56 Other groups were also opposed to 
the inclusion of a legislative definition. This arose from a concern that the inclusion of a 
definition of sexual reputation would increase the risk of evidence of the complainant's 
sexual conduct being admitted on the basis that it did not technically come within the 
definition of sexual reputation.
57 
52 Department for Women Heroines of Fortitude: The Experiences of Women in Court and Victims of 
Sexual Assault (Department for Women , New South Wales, 1996) 229-230. 
53 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 8, para 4.81. 
54 R Bonney, Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 Monitoring and Evaluation Interim Report 3: 
Court Procedures (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney, 1987); Department for Women, 
above n 52, 230. 
55 Law Commission of New South Wales, above n 8, para 4.81. 
56 Ibid, para 4.83. 
57 DPP Witness Assistance Service Consultation (submission to Law Reform Commission of New South 
Wales , 1998) 3. 
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The recent changes made by s44(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 may lead to similar 
problems in New Zealand. This raises the question whether the Evidence Act 2006 
should have included a definition of sexual reputation. It is uncertain how the courts will 
interpret s44(2) of the Evidence Act 2006. However, the Courts approach to s23A of the 
Evidence Act 1908 provides a useful indicator in assessing how the courts may interpret 
s44(2). The New Zealand courts have for the most part interpreted s23A in accordance 
with its purpose under the Evidence Act 1908.58 In 1983 for instance Young 
acknowledged that judges and counsel were acting in accordance with the spirit of the 
legislation. Direct questions by defence counsel concerning the complainant's prior 
sexual history, were in the absence of any application under s23A of the Evidence Act 
1908 very rare.59 It is important to consider however whether this success is due to 
legislative drafting or the exercise of judicial discretion. If the success of s23A is reliant 
on the exercise of judicial discretion, issues over the definition of sexual reputation may 
arise in the future with changes to the bar. 
S23A set a high threshold for the admission of sexual reputation evidence. This is 
consistent with other common law jurisdictions. In England for example, s41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies a two stage test. First, the 
evidence must fall within one of the specified exception to the general rule and second, 
the court must be "satisfied that a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering 
unsafe a conclusion of the jury or the court on any relevant issue in the case". 60 Yet 
despite this strict test, research reveals that sexual history evidence is frequently 
introduced without any application under s4 l of the Act. This has been attributed to the 
58 Temkin "Regulating sexual History Evidence: The Limits of Discretionary Legislation" above, n 6, 977. 
59 Young, above n 23, 133. 
60 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s4 l (2)(b). 
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drafting of the Act and the application of judicial discretion. The study found 
considerable confusion over when section 41 applied. However, there were also clear 
attempts to circumnavigate the legislation in order to admit sexual history evidence.
61 
The success of s23A of the Evidence Act 1908 may likewise be attributed to both 
legislative drafting and judicial discretion. It thus possible that, like the English, judges 
may use their discretion to circumnavigate the provisions despite the application of a 
strict test for admissibility. In light of this, the attitude of Judges towards sexual history 
evidence is crucial to New Zealand's continued success in regulating sexual history 
evidence. The inclusion of a statutory definition of reputation would arguably ensure 
judicial accountability and prevent judges from circumnavigating the provision in s44(2). 
It is not necessary however to define the terms sexual reputation and sexual 
experience in New Zealand. The flexibility of the terms is necessary to ensure that 
relevant evidence is not wrongly excluded and the defendant unfairly prejudiced. 
Although the exclusion of a statutory definition leaves it to the judiciary to apply the 
provision in accordance with the spirit of the legislation, it is unlikely they will take a 
backward step. The development of judicial culture, changing societal views and the 
continued education of the judiciary will seek to ensure the continued success of New 
Zealand's rape shield legislation. 
V SEXUAL EXPERIENCE 
A Sexual Experience with Third Parties 
1 Law Commission Recommendations and s44( 1) Evidence Act 2006 
61 L Kelly, J Temkin and S Griffiths, above n37, 47. 
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The Law Commission did not address the complainant's sexual experience with 
third parties, nor has s44(l ). S44( l) of the Evidence Act 2006 reproduces the current 
s23A. Evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with third parties is admissible 
by leave of the judge where it is "of such direct relevance to the facts in issue ... that to 
exclude it would be contrary to the interests of justice".62 
2 Alternative Proposal 
The Wellington Women 's Lawyers Association (WWLA) proposed extending 
s44(1) to completely prohibit evidence or questions relating to the complainant's sexual 
experience with third parties for the purposes of supporting or challenging the 
complainant's truthfulness or consent. Evidence of the complainant's sexual experience 
used for other purposes would be admissible by leave of the judge if it was of direct 
relevance to the facts in issue.63 The WWLA argued that the admission of sexual history 
evidence reinforced negative stereotypes and confused the issues at trial. 64 
It is generally accepted that prior sexual history evidence is no longer relevant to 
the victim's truthfulness or credibility.65 More controversial however is consent. The 
WWLA did not specify whether consent included a reasonable belief in consent. 
However, the author will continue on the basis that it does not. The author agrees with 
the WWLA that evidence of the complainants past sexual experience with third parties 
should be prohibited for the purposes of challenging the complainant's consent. 
62 Evidence Act 2006. s44( I ). 
63 Wellington Women Lawyers Association Supplementary submission of the Evidence Bill , above n 46, 3. 
64 Ibid . 
65 V Berger "Man 's Trial , Women 's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom" ( 1977) 77 Col um L Rev I , 
55. 
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3 Relevance and the Complainants Sexual Experience with Third Parties 
Proponents of sexual history evidence justify its admission on the basis that an 
individual's past sexual conduct can predict their future behaviour. Eisenbud for example 
argues that a woman, who has engaged in sexual intercourse in the past, is more likely 
then a woman who has not, to consent on another occasion.
66 
This argument is based on 
the premise that "if she did it once, she'd do it again".
67 
In the past this assumption may 
have been viewed as correct. A woman who dared to defy societal conventions was 
considered to have been more likely to do so on another occasion.
68 
However, in today's 
society pre martial sex is more common. In the British National Survey of Sexual 
Attitudes and Lifestyles for example, ninety eight percent of women aged between twenty 
five and thirty four had engaged in sexual intercourse.
69 
The commonality of sexual 
intercourse in modern society thus renders the complainant's prior sexual history 
irrelevant. It suggests nothing more then that the complainant, like the vast majority of 
women, is prepared to have sex outside of marriage.
70 
To suggest a woman's past sexual behaviour is relevant to her consent on another 
occasion is to deny her ability to choose her sexual partners. It assumes that women are 
"bundles of dispositions rather then autonomous human beings".
71 
Proponents of sexual 
history evidence have criticised this argument as specious. To be relevant, evidence only 
66 F Einsenbud "Limitations of the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the 
Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?" ( 1975) 3 
Hofstra L Rev 403,415. 
67 Berger, above n 65, 55. 
68 Ibid. 
69 A Johnson and others Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Blackwell Scientific: Oxford, 1994). 
70 M Redmayne "Myths, Relationships and Coincidences: The New Problems of sexual History" (2003) 7 
lnt' l J Evidence & Proof 75, 78. 
71 C Boyle and M MacCrimmon "The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analyzing Sexual Assault as if 
Equality Really Mattered" (1998) 41 Crim LQ 198, 223. 
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needs to make the desired inference more or less probable. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that a woman who has engaged in previous consensual sexual intercourse will be 
more likely then a virgin to consent to sexual intercourse again.
72 This argument is 
based on an inherently flawed premise. It assumes that once a woman has consented to 
sex she will always say yes. Thus, if we accept the above argument we must also accept 
that the yes/yes inference is correct. This premise is not valid. Evidence of the 
complainant's sexual experience with third parties is not probative of her consent to the 
defendant on another occasion. 
The author acknowledges that evidence of the complainant's sexual experience 
with the defendant also appears to rely on this premise. However, it is distinguishable 
from evidence of the complainant's sexual history with third parties in that it seeks to 
predict state of mind rather then suggest that the complainant is the type of women to say 
yes. Evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant focuses on the 
nature of the relationship while evidence of the complainant's sexual history with third 
parties focuses on the type of women the complainant is. 
(a) Pattern of similar conduct 
To circumnavigate the flaws in the above argument other commentators have 
argued that while a woman has the right to choose her sexual partners, in certain 
circumstances her consent to intercourse will lose "its unique and non-transferable 
character".73 This will occur where the circumstances of the alleged offence are 
strikingly similar to the circumstances of the complainant' s previous sexual history or 
72 D Rudstein "Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems" (1976) 18 WMLR I , 22. 
73 J Sutherlin "Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Connict with the Confrontation Clause" ( 1976) 9 Ind L Rev 
418, 430. 
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where there is a pattern of similar conduct.
74 While this was intended to capture 
particular methods or unique aspects of a women's sexual behaviour, it has opened the 
door to unwarnntable inferences based on a women's promiscuity. Once a woman has a 
noted pattern of sexual conduct, that is, that it can be established she is promiscuous, her 
pattern of sexual behaviour can be admitted.
75 This undermines the very purpose of rape 
shield legislation. The rape reform process was initiated to reflect the idea that a 
woman's decision to engage in consensual intercourse is made afresh in each new and 
different situation. Consent by definition can never lose its non-transferable character. 
Consent is "temporally constrained, non-transferable from one party to the next and 
specific as to the act".
76 
The admission of sexual history evidence where it establishes a pattern of similar 
behaviour however is flawed in other respects. When for example will evidence of the 
complainants past sexual history be sufficiently similar to be admitted? What elements 
make one act of sexual intercourse strikingly similar to another? The essential act is after 
all fairly simple.
77 Judicial applications of the pattern test illustrate the unpredictable and 
subjective nature of determining when a pattern exists. In State v Shoffner far example 
the court found the following pieces of evidence sufficiently similar to form a pattern: (1) 
evidence by a witness who claimed to have seen the woman at a club many times 
attracting men; (2) evidence of one episode of consensual sex with one of the brothers of 
the defendants; and (3) evidence by a witness who testified that he had once observed the 
74 A Ordovet "Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: the Unlamented Death of Character for 
Chastity" (l 977) 63 Cornell L Rev 90, 94. 
75 M Anderson "From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality Licence: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield 
Law" (2002) Geo Wash LR I, 17. 
76 Ibid. 
77 New South Wales Department of the Attorney General and of Justice, Criminal Law Review Division, 
Report on Rape and Various Other Sexual Offences ( 1977) 29; J Temkin "Evidence in Sexual Assault 
Cases: The Scottish Proposal and Alternatives" ( 1984) 47 Mod L Rev 625, 643. 
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woman in an inn with two men standing in front of her, one of whom was zipping up his 
pants.7s The court argued that this evidence was similar in that it suggested "that the 
prosecuting witness was the initiator, the aggressor, in her sexual encounters".79 Contrary 
to the courts conclusion however, these three pieces of evidence appear to differ 
considerably. The court did not consider the similarities between these three types of 
evidence but assigned an unwarranted uniqueness to the women's role as initiator. Such 
a broad interpretation of similarity renders the idea of a pattern meaningless. Virtually 
any sequence of sexual behaviour will appear to be a pattern.so This reinforces the 
common Jaw stereotype of some women as rapable. Once a woman has consented to sex 
she may never say no. The application of the similar pattern test may be particularly 
harsh to sex workers. The admission of evidence on this basis would effectively put 
prostitutes outside the protection of rape shield provisions. 
Even putting aside the issues of what constitutes a pattern of similarity, the use of 
pattern evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the truth seeking process. The 
admission of the complainant's past sexual conduct subverts the truth seeking process by 
biasing jurors against the complainant. In a study by Pugh for example, jurors were given 
a rape scenario in which the complainant was either virginal or sexually experienced.s 1 
The study found, with all other variables held constant, that eighty one percent of jurors 
voted for conviction where the complainant was a virgin, compared with sixty percent 
78 State v Shoffner ( 1990) 302 SE 2d 830, 832. 
79 Ibid , 832-833. 
80 E Kessler "Pattern of Sexual Conduct Evidence and Present Consent: Limiting Admissibility of Sexual 
History Evidence in Rape Prosecutions" (J 992) 14 WRLR 79, 83. 
81 M Pugh "Contributory Fault and Rape Convictions: Loglinear Models for Blaming the Victim" ( 1983) 
Soc Psycho! Q 233, 236-237. 
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when the complainant had prior sexual experiences.
82 The admission of the pattern 
evidence thus allows jurors to make decisions on an illogical and improper basis. 
The arguments in favour of admitting evidence of the complainant's sexual 
experience with third parties thus do not stand up to scrutiny. A woman's willingness to 
have sex with other men on other occasions is a poor indicator of whether she consented 
to have sex with the defendant on another occasion. To admit evidence on the basis that 
a persons future behaviour can be predicted from their past conduct, denies a women's 
sexual autonomy and right to choose her sexual partners. It propounds the view that 
consent to sexual intercourse can be determined according to the type of woman the 
complainant is perceived to be. The admission of the complainant's sexual history thus 
perpetrates the very myths rape shield legislation was designed to prevent. 
4 Compatibility with the Defendant's Rights 
The defendant's right to present and elicit testimony is not absolute, his rights are 
limited to evidence that has some probative value.83 Evidence of the complainant's 
sexual experience with third parties has little probative value. It relies on the discredited 
yes/yes inference that consent to some men sometimes means yes to any man any time. 
The proposed changes to s44 of the Evidence Act 2006 thus will not unfairly hamper the 
accused's defence. It only excludes evidence of little probative value. 
The exclusion of evidence of the complainant's sexual history for the purposes of 
challenging the complainants consent further does not deny the defendant the right to 
conduct a defence. The defendant may legitimately introduce witnesses to corroborate 
82 Ibid . 
83 J Tanford and A Bocchino "Rape Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment" ( 1980) 128 U Pa LR 544, 557. 
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the complainant's behaviour at the time of the alleged incident or cross-examine the 
complainant about what she did and said at the time of the alleged rape. 84 Consent should 
be established by proving how the complainant behaved with the particular defendant on 
the particular occasion and not through her earlier conduct with other men. 
The WWLA proposal seeks to extend the protections afforded to victims in s44. 
Under the current law, victims are subjected to irrelevant and embarrassing questioning 
on their sexual past. This not only adds to the trauma suffered by victims but has a 
prejudicial effect on the fact finding process. The extension of s44 to prohibit evidence 
of the complainant' s sexual experiences with third parties for the purposes of supporting 
or challenging truthfulness or consent increases the protections afforded to complainants 
while remaining consistent with the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
B Previous sexual Experience with the Defendant 
1 Law Commission Recommendations and s44 Evidence Act 2006 
The complainant's previous sexual experience with the accused was not regulated 
by s23A of the Evidence Act 1908. The complainant's sexual experience with the 
defendant was admissible without leave. The Law Commission proposed extending this 
to require evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant to be 
directly relevant to the facts in issue. Permission to admit this evidence however was not 
required.85 This recommendation was designed to encourage lawyers to think about the 
relevance and purpose of sexual history evidence. While evidence of the complainant's 
84 Kessler, above n 80, 96. 
85 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 , vol. 2, Wellington, 1999) 
124. 
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previous sexual experience with the defendant will sorr.etimes be relevant, it is not 
always. 86 
The Evidence Act 2006 did not adopt the Law Commission's recommendation. 
The defence may adduce evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the 
accused without leave of the judge. Under the Evidence Act 2006, there are few 
limitations on the defendant's right to adduce evidence of the complainants past sexual 
experience with the defendant. To be admissible the defence must only show two things. 
First, that the evidence is relevant. S7 of the Evidence Act 2006 defines relevant 
evidence as evidence that "has a tendency to prove or disprove anything that is of 
consequence to the determination of the proceeding". This is a low standard. Secondly, 
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk that the evidence will have an 
"unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding".87 Prima facie this appears to be a strong 
test. The judge may exclude evidence where it has a tendency to influence a decision on 
an improper or illogical basis. 88 This section however is unlikely to prevent the 
admission of evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant. S8 
largely codifies the existing common law rules in relation to "sufficient" or "legal 
relevance" .89 Under the common law, evidence of the complainant's sexual experience 
with the accused was rarely excluded under this category. The threshold for admitting 
such evidence is thus relatively low. It is acknowledged however that in certain 
circumstances other rules of evidence may apply to the complainant's previous sexual 
experience with the defendant. 
86 New Zealand Law Commiss ion Evidence law: Character and Credibility: A Discussion Paper, above n 
14, 112. 
87 Evidence Act 2006, s8. 
88 New Zealand Law Commission Evidence Code and Commenrarv, above n 85 , 33. 
89 Ibid. . 
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2 Alternative Proposal 
The WWLA recommended that evidence of the complainant's previous sexual 
experience with the defendant should be admissible by leave of the judge, where it is of 
such direct relevance to the facts in issue that to exclude it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice. The author proposes that evidence of the complainant's sexual 
experience with the accused should be governed by the same rules as evidence of the 
complainant's sexual experience with third parties. This recommendation is based on 
three grounds. First, evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the accused 
will not always be relevant to her consent. Second, the prejudicial nature of the evidence 
means that it may sometimes be inappropriate to admit the evidence and thirdly, given the 
high incidence of acquaintance rape it is important for the courts to consider why the 
evidence is relevant. 
(a) Relevance 
In many cases evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant 
will be relevant to consent. The probative value of such evidence is it ability to raise an 
inference as to the complainants state of mind at the time of the alleged offence.90 In the 
absence of further information it is reasonable to infer that the complainant's amorous 
mindset towards the defendant was continuing at the time of the alleged event. 91 This 
proposition has been criticised by commentators for failing to recognise the decision to 
90 Hire, above n4, 598-599. 
91 D Paciocco "Techniques for Eviscerating the Concept of Relevance; A Reply and Rejoinder to "Sex with 
the Accused on Other Occasions: The Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection" 33 CR (4th) 365, 371 . 
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engage in sexual activity is made afresh, in each new and different situation.92 The mere 
fact that the complainant has engaged in consensual sexual activity with the defendant is 
not probative of her consent on another occasion. It tells us nothing of "the accused's 
behaviour on the night in question, what he said to the complainant, or her reaction and 
emotional state".93 
This argument 1s criticised for employing a "but for" or "just because" 
reasoning. 94 The problem with this type of reasoning is that may exclude relevant 
evidence. Take for an example the case of a defendant who is found in possession of a 
gun used in a robbery shortly after it occurred. The fact of his possession does not mean 
that he committed the robbery; however few would argue that his possession was 
irrelevant.95 Thus, it may be that at the time of the incident in question the complainant 
in fact loathed the defendant. However, in the absence of other information it is 
reasonable to assume that her amorous mindset towards the defendant continued. 
Whether this inference will be drawn will depend on the other evidence in the case.96 
There may be other circumstances which suggest that the complainant's previous sexual 
experience with the defendant is not relevant to her consent. 
Evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant however will 
not always be relevant to her consent. Evidence of a single sexual encounter remote in 
time from the alleged offence will often provide little assistance in assessing the 
92 H Schwartz "Sex with the Accused on Other Occasions: the Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection" 31 CR (41h) 232, 233-234. 
93 Ibid, 234. 
94 
Paciocco, above n 91 , 370-37 J; N Kibble 'The Relevance and Admissibility of Prior Sexual History with 
the Defendant in Sexual Offence Cases" (200 I) 32 Cambrian L Rev 27, 51. 95 Paciocco, above n 91, 370. 
96 Ibid. 
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complainant's consent.97 The failure of the courts to scrutinise this type of evidence or to 
require counsel to identify its relevance has enabled evidence of minimal probative value 
to be adduced.98 The author proposes regulating this type of sexual history evidence to 
ensure that these remote incidents are not admitted into evidence. This is particularly 
important given the grave effects sexual history evidence has on the victims of rape. 
(b) Prejudicial effect 
The prejudicial nature of this lcind of evidence strengthens the argument for 
judicial control. Research suggests that juries tend to attribute less responsibility to the 
accused where the perpetrator was an acquaintance of the victim.99 The existence of a 
prior sexual relationship with the accused makes it "practically impossible to convince 
the jury that the incident in question was anything other than one in a long series of 
consensual ac~s". 100 In mock jury studies for example, participants who heard evidence 
of the complainants past sexual history with the defendant, were less likely to find the 
complainant credible and more likely to believe that she consented to sex with the 
accused. 101 Further, this prejudice cannot be controlled for through judicial direction. In 
research by Schuller and Hastings for example, the prejudicial impact of prior sexual 
relationship evidence was unaffected by judicial instruction. '
02 The prejudicial nature of 
97 H Galvin "Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade" 
(1985) 70 Min L Rev 763, 815. 
98 T Henning and S Bronitt "Rape Victims on Trial: Regulating the Use and Abuse of Sexual History 
Evidence" in Patricia Easteal (ed) Balancing th e Scales: Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1998) 76, 91. 
99 J Temkin "Sexual History Evidence: Beware of the Backlash" (2003) Crim L Rev 217, 233 . 
100 D Bryden and S Lengnick "Rape in the Criminal Justice System" (1997) 87 J Crim L & Criminology 
1194, 1294. 
101 R Schuller and P Hastings "Complainant Sexual History Evidence: It ' s Impact on Mock Jurors 
Decisions" (2002) 26 Psychology of Women Quarterly 252, 259. 
102 Ibid . 
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this type of evidence suggests that it should be subject to judicial control. The free 
admission of prior relationship evidence not only increases the possibility of wrongful 
acquittal but puts the victim and her credibility on trial. 
(c) Frequency of acquaintance rape 
The final argument for the regulation of this type of evidence is based on the 
frequency with which evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct arises. In the 
2006 New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims for example, three quarters of 
participants reported knowing the offender prior to the attack. 103 This evidence suggests 
that evidence of the complainant's previous sexual history with the defendant will arise 
on a regular basis. Given the large number of victims affected by the admission of such 
evidence, it is essential that the court revisit and challenge the general assumption of 
relevance in these cases. 
The extension of s44(1) to include evidence of the complainant's sexual 
experience with the accused is consistent with the defendant's right to a fair trial. In 
Darrach for example, the court held that disallowing evidence of prior sexual history 
with the accused did not necessarily deny the accused the right to a fair trial. 104 The 
direct relevance test in s44(1) is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 105 It does 
not restrict the court from exercising its discretion consistently with the Bill of Rights Act 
1990. 106 It thus seems illogical to suggest that extending the direct relevance test to 
103 A Morris and J Reilly The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington, 2001) 230. 
104 R v Darrach, above n 30. 
lOS Crown Law Office Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Evidence Bill 
(ATTI 14/1298, Wellington, 2005). 
106 Ibid. 
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evidence of the complainant's sexual experience with the defendant is inconsistent with 
the defendant's rights to a fair trial. The WWLA proposal is not a blanket approach. The 
defendant may still offer evidence of his prior sexual relations with the complainant 
where it is relevant to the facts in issue. This will occur in most cases. 
The inclusion of an express rule requires judges and counsel to focus on the 
reasons for offering the evidence.
107 This extends the protections offered to victims by 
preventing irrelevant fishing expeditions into the victims past. One defence lawyer for 
example noted that "you can't just meander through someone's past. Less focused cross-
examination gave you that leeway to have a sort of walk around the houses".
108 
3 Assessing Relevance 
The author proposes adopting the guidelines recommended by the WWLA in 
assessing the relevance of the complainant's sexual history with the accused. In deciding 
whether the evidence is directly relevant to the facts in issue the Judge should consider 
three factors. 109 Firstly, the frequency with which the acts occu1Ted. Fishman argues that 
the nature of the prior relationship is an important factor in assessing the relevance of 
evidence. The courts are likely to consider an extended period of intimacy to be far more 
relevant than a single or casual encounter. 
110 Secondly, the court should consider the 
connection in time between the acts which are the subject matter of the evidence and the 
acts which constitute the alleged offence. The connection in time between the alleged 
events will affect both the reliability and relevance of the evidence. Thirdly, the court 
107 Law Commission , Reform of the Law, above n 18, 51. 
108 Kelly, Temkin and Griffiths, above n 37 , 49. 
109 Wellington Women Lawyer' s Association , Supplementary Submission of rhe Evidence Bill, above n 46, 
4. 
11° Fishman, above n 11 , 743. 
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should consider the similarity between the acts which are the subject matter of the 
evidence and the acts which constitute the offence. Where the previous consensual 
relations differ significantly from those of the alleged rape, the court may restrict the 
evidence.
111 
These factors are currently taken into account in assessing the admissibility 
of propensity evidence involving the accused. The author argues that such issues are 
equally relevant in assessing the relevance of the complainant's sexual experience with 
the accused. 
Evidence of the complainant' s prior sexual history with the accused is a form of 
propensity evidence. The complainant's sexual experience with the defendant is 
introduced to suggest that she had a propensity to have a particular state of mind. It is 
difficult to see why women in respect of this type of propensity evidence should be 
treated any differently from propensity evidence involving the accused. 112 The accused 
has traditionally been protected from the admission of propensity evidence. Only in 
special circumstances could the accused's propensity to act in a certain way or to have 
certain state of mind be admitted into evidence. These protections arose out of a need to 
ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial. The author proposes that these same 
protections be extended to the victims of rape. 
Historically, the evidential disadvantages suffered by complainants were the result 
of a fear of false rape allegations. 11 3 Sir Mathew Hale for example noted that rape was an 
accusation "easy to be made ... and harder to be defended by the party accused though 
111 Ibid . 744. 
11 2 
Wellington Women Lawyer's Association Supplementary Submission of the Evidence Bill, above n 46, 
4. 
113 
J Temkin "Regulating Sexual History Evidence: The Limits of Discretionary Legislation", above n 6, 
947. 
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never so innocent". 114 This assumption has now been discredited. Research shows that 
rape is no more likely to be fabricated then any other offence.
115 The historical basis for 
differentiating between these two types of propensity evidence is thus no longer 
applicable. There is thus no reason to treat this type of propensity evidence any 
differently from propensity evidence about the accused. Requiring judges to take these 
factors into account will seek to ensure the relevance of the evidence and protect 
complainants from in-elevant questioning. 
4 Proviso 
The WWLA also recommended adding a reminder to judges that a complainant's 
previous sexual experience with the defendant is not necessarily relevant to her consent 
on the occasion in question. There must be something more which is of direct relevance 
to the facts in issue before the evidence can be admitted.
116 The author agrees with this 
proposal. The inclusion of an express reminder will encourage judges to identify exactly 
why evidence is relevant before admitting it into evidence. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The Evidence Act 2006 has made little change to s23A of the Evidence Act 1908. 
The most substantial change has been the prohibition of sexual reputation evidence in 
s44(2) of the Act. While this section has little practical value in terms of the exclusion of 
reputation evidence, it has immense symbolic importance. Despite this change however, 
114 M Hale (1646) I Pleas of th e Crown 635. 
115 P Rumney "False Allegations of Rape" (2006) 65 Cam LJ 128, 143. 
116 Wellington Women Lawyer's Association Supplementary Submission of the Evidence Bill, above n 46, 
4. 
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the Evidence Act 2006 has been cautious in its approach to sexual history evidence. The 
Evidence Act has not changed the position in regards to evidence of the complainant's 
sexual experience with the accused or her experience with third parties. It is thus 
unlikely that the protections and rights afforded to victims will be furthered by the Act. 
The author thus proposes adopting alternative proposals. The above evaluation of 
the WWLA proposals suggests that the protections afforded to victims may be extended 
without unfairly hampering the accused's right to a fair trial. The author proposes 
making several changes; (I) evidence of the complainants sexual experience with third 
parties should be prohibited for the purposes of supporting or challenging the 
complainant' s truthfulness or consent; (2) evidence of the complainants previous sexual 
experience with the defendant should only be admissible by leave of the judge, where it is 
of such direct relevance to the facts in issue that to exclude it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice; (3) the inclusion of guidelines to assist judges in assessing whether 
the evidence is directly relevant to the facts in issue and; (4) the inclusion of a proviso to 
remind judges that a complainant's previous sexual experience with the defendant is not 
necessarily relevant to her consent on the occasion in question. 
These changes seek to protect victims from irrelevant and embarrassing cross-
examination in court. This will have a number of positive benefits. Firstly, it will 
encourage victims of rape to report offences, second, it will discourage the use of rape 
myths in decision making, third, it will help to shield victims from the "barbarity" of 
cross-examination and lastly, it may have a positive effect on the conviction rates for 
rape. These benefits are achievable without unfairly comprising the defendants right to a 
fair trial. 
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